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ed.2012.Abstract Objective: To examine the practical issues arising in implementation of DNR from the
perspectives of maqasid al shari’at and qawa’id al shari’at.
Methods: The purposes and principles of the Law provided a conceptual framework for analyz-
ing practical issues related to DNR orders. The issues were identiﬁed from a Pubmed literature
search with the key word ‘DNR’ covering about 30 years and were analyzed as they related to
the principles of intention, certainty and preventing harm and also to the purposes of preserving
life and resources.
Results: It is proposed that DNR orders be written for patients in an established death process,
i.e. cardiorespiratory failure beyond Young’s point ‘z’. Patients with terminal incurable conditions
who develop acute, reversible cardiorespiratory arrest should be resuscitated if the net beneﬁt will
last for a reasonable time. Five components of DNR (cardiopulmonary resuscitation involving
chest compression and oxygenation, endotracheal intubation, mechanical ventilation, deﬁbrillation
and vasoactive or ionotropic medication) could be provided on a case-by-case basis. The interven-
tions may or may not include renal dialysis, blood transfusion, parenteral nutrition, pulmonary
hygiene and normal treatment such as antibiotics. All patients, irrespective of their DNR status,
deserve supportive care.
Conclusion: To improve DNR processes, training should be given on end-of-life ethical issues for
physicians and nurses, DNR orders should specify interventions, the autonomy of physicians who
have a conscientious objection to DNR should be respected, more psychosocial support should be
given to the families of DNR patients, more empirical research is required on DNR, and DNR deci-
sions should be audited regularly.
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07.003Introduction
The two main objectives of DNR orders are to respect pa-
tients’ autonomy and to prevent unnecessary, non-beneﬁcial
interventions. These objectives are not well met in practice.1
Confusion in discussions and decision-making about end-of-
life issues arises from different perceptions of what the terms
mean. Clariﬁcation of the terminology used and the underlying
conceptual basis is needed. Most DNR policies provide proce-
dural and technical guidelines2,3 but do not explore the
conceptual basis, leaving the physician at a loss when the situ-Ltd. All rights reserved.
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has no conceptual or methodological basis for independent
thinking. Algorithms can help physicians to make end-of-life
intervention decisions quickly under pressure of time,4 but
no speciﬁc case will ﬁt the algorithm exactly, so that physicians
need basic principles that can be applied to all situations.
The aim of this paper is to provide a conceptual basis for
analyzing ethical issues related to DNR based on the principles
of Islamic Law. It is not based on original sources from the
Qur’an and sunnat, nor does it refer to past or current legal
opinions, fatawa, because its purpose is to give physicians sim-
ple axioms (maqasid al shari’at and qawa’id al ﬁqh) that will al-
low reasoning and understanding of complicated ethical issues.
These axioms were derived inductively from original sources
by jurists in the ﬁfth century of hijra. Equipping physicians
with maqasid and qawa’id tools for analyzing ethical issues will
‘‘teach them to ﬁsh instead of giving them a ﬁsh’’. The circum-
stances of each ethical case are unique, and no one legal opin-
ion can cover all the nuances, thus leaving room for the
physician’s personal analysis and understanding. The ﬁnal
decisions in speciﬁc cases should be referred to the competent
legal authorities in each jurisdiction. If the authorities present
textual evidence, nass, there is no room for use of ijtihad based
on maqasid and qawa’id, in conformity with the principle that
there is no justiﬁcation for ijtihad in the presence of textual evi-
dence, la masaagha li al ijtihad ﬁ mawrid al nass (Majallat Arti-
cle No. 14).
Materials and Methods
The purposes of the Law, maqasid al shari’at,5 and the princi-
ples of the Law, qawa’id al ﬁqh,6,7 provided a conceptual
framework for analyzing practical issues related to DNR or-
ders. The issues were identiﬁed from a Pubmed literature
search with the keyword ‘DNR’ and covering a span of about
30 years of DNR experience. The issues were analyzed as they
related to the principle of intention, qa’idat al qasd; the princi-
ple of certainty, qa’idat al yaqiin; and the principle of prevent-
ing harm, qa’idat al dharar. They were also analyzed as they
relate to the purposes of preserving life, hifdh al nafs, and of
preserving resources, hifdh al mal. The issues are summarized
in Tables 1 and 2.Table 1: Ethical issues in ‘Do not resuscitate’ (DNR) and
maqasid al shari’at.
Purpose Ethical issues and practices
Protection of life,
hifdh al nafs
Instituting beneﬁcial artiﬁcial life support
protects life
Euthanasia in the form of a DNR order
violates life
Protection of wealth,
hifdh al maal
Instituting futile life support wastes resources
Inappropriate ICU admission wastes
resources
Over-utilization of ICU resources for
futile cases
Resource conservation by palliative care
ICU, intensive care unit.Results
Issues related to the principle of certainty, qa’idat al yaqiin
Terminal illness, maradh al mawt, deﬁned as illness from which
recovery is not expected, is also called the ‘end of life’ or
‘approaching the end of life’. The period can vary from a
few days to several months. The deﬁnition of terminal illness
is based on empirical probability estimates reﬂecting experi-
ence with similar patients who succumbed to their disease.
As terminal illness is a probability statement, it does not apply
to all patients, as diagnosis and prognosis are not 100% infal-
lible. There are anecdotal reports of terminally ill patients liv-
ing a normal life for years, but these are the exception and
reﬂect the fact that probability estimates by humans are not
perfect because of limited knowledge and understanding of
‘the seen’, ‘ilm al shahadat, and complete ignorance of ‘the un-
seen’, ‘ilm al ghaib. The basic default position is that of the cer-
tainty, yaqiin, that illness is reversible. A diagnosis of terminal
illness must be based on strong clinical evidence interpreted
within previous institutional experience. This is in conformity
with the principle of the Law that certainty cannot be voided
by doubt or speculation, al yaqiin la yazuulu bi al shakk
(Majallat Article No. 4).
Death and the moment of its occurrence are uncertain in
this era of technology. Death is not an event but a process,
with a time line that may be long or short. Theoretically, death
starts at birth, because cells and tissues die and degenerate.
During the period of growth and development until about
35 years of age, repair or regenerative processes dominate
degenerative ones. After that time, degenerative processes in-
crease, until regeneration and repair are overwhelmed and
death can ensue without a speciﬁc pathology. This is the basis
for the inevitability of death. Pathological insults to the body
structure or functions hasten the degenerative processes and
may hasten the process of death.
Degeneration affects all organs and functions of the body,
but the ﬁnal common pathway is cardiorespiratory failure,
which impairs perfusion of the cells by oxygen and the nutri-
ents necessary for metabolism. Brain tissue, being the most
sensitive to oxygen and nutrient deprivation, will die ﬁrst.
There is, however, a chicken-and-egg argument here. If the
brain dies ﬁrst, the cardiorespiratory system will die soon after-
wards, because its coordinated function requires that some
brain centers remain active and alive. If the cardiorespiratory
function dies ﬁrst, the brain will not receive oxygen and nutri-
ents and will die. Cardiorespiratory failure is progressive but
hastens as death approaches. There is a point of irreversibility
along this death time line, called Young’s ‘point z’, which sep-
arates prolongation of life from prolongation of death. Beyond
this point, an established death process occurs. All forms of life
support, basic and advanced, used before this point have some
beneﬁt, albeit temporary; advanced life support beyond this
point is futile. It is unfortunate that many patients who are be-
yond point z are treated in intensive instead of palliative care,
because physicians are reluctant to decide to withhold or with-
draw life support.8 The deﬁnition of legal death is under the
principle of custom, qa’idat al ‘aadat. It is based on the existing
consensus among physicians at that time and is considered
usual custom; it is therefore legally binding, al ‘aadat muhakka-
mat (Majallat Article No. 36). This implies that the deﬁnition
Table 2: Ethical issues in ‘Do not resuscitate’ (DNR) and
qawa’id al ﬁqh.
Principle Ethical issues and practices
Principle of
intention, qa’idat al
qasd
Diﬀerence between DNR and
euthanasia is based on underlying
intention
Principle of
certainty, qa’idat al
yaqiin
Deﬁnition of terminal illness involves
uncertainty
Determination of death involves
uncertainty
Doubts about implementing pre-
hospital DNR orders
Confusing DNR for DNT
Principle of injury,
qa’idat al dharar
Harm of intervention in futile cases
with no foreseeable beneﬁts
Patient and family consent to DNR
protects patients from harm,
Violation of patient autonomy in
DNR and CPR hurts patients’
interests.
Physician paternalism violates
patients’ autonomy and safety.
Family assent to DNR is additional
protection for the patient.
Age discrimination occurs when
DNR orders are made for the elderly.
Respecting physicians’ conscientious
objection to DNR
Regular audits of DNR decisions
Empirical research on DNR
Principle of custom,
qa’idat al ‘aadat
Following policies and guidelines on
DNR
Improving physician knowledge and
practices regarding DNR
Procedures for correct identiﬁcation
of DNR patients
Criteria for selecting patients
appropriate for DNR orders
Determining the content of a DNR
order
DNT, ‘Do not treat’; CPR, cardiopulonary resuscitation.
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according to the principle that changes in the customary are
accepted, la yunkaru taghayyur al ahkaam bi taghayyur al az-
maan (Majallat Article No. 39).
Perioperational DNR is in a grey area. It is impossible to tell
whether cardiopulmonary arrest in the perioperational period
is due to the disease or to anesthetic drugs.9 There is ambiguity
and a diversity of perceptions and implementation of perioper-
ational DNR orders.10,11 Some hospitals have questioned peri-
operational suspension of DNR orders12,13: some
automatically suspend DNR orders, while others offer no, lim-
ited or full resuscitation.9 Some address the matter on a case-
by-case basis.14 The confusion is greater if suspension of DNR
orders is being considered for palliative surgery.15 According
to the principle of certainty, we should avoid doubtable things,
and this is reinforced by the hadith ‘‘leave what causes you
doubt to what does not’’, da’ ma yuriibuka ila ma la yurribuka
(Sahih al Tirmidhi hadith No 2518). I would conclude that, to
avoid doubt, DNR orders should be suspended in theperioperational period; they can be reinstituted after the
patient has recovered from the effects of the anesthetic.
Pre-hospital DNR is also associated with uncertainties. In
emergencies, ambulance personnel may resuscitate persons
with advance directives against resuscitation by mistake, be-
cause of lack of proper patient identiﬁcation or lack of avail-
ability of DNR documents.16–18 They may undertake futile
resuscitation19 because they are uncertain about the prognosis.
Emergencies such as choking or suicide attempts in patients
with DNR orders create complex legal problems.20 I think
that, according to the general principle mentioned above,
ambulance personnel should resuscitate whenever they are in
doubt, because of the overriding purpose of protecting life,
maqsad hifdh al nafs.
Issues related to the purpose of protection of life, maqsad hifdh
al nafs
Artiﬁcial life support consists a series of medical measures ta-
ken to reverse cardiorespiratory failure in order to fulﬁll the
purpose of protecting life. It can comprise basic life support,
such as chest compression, or advanced life support, such as
intubation and mechanical ventilation. The survival rate after
resuscitation is low: at best <20%.21,22 Survival is determined
more by the underlying disease than the resuscitation efforts,23
indicating a need to re-evaluate the use of resuscitation in the
ﬁrst place. Instituting futile life support measures violates the
purpose of conserving resources, hifdh al maal. It can also vio-
late the purpose of protecting life when scarce resources are
used up by futile life support, while patients who could beneﬁt
from life support are left to die.
The ‘doctrine of futility’ is invoked when interventions have
no net, lasting impact on cardiorespiratory decline and may
even add risks, such as rib fracture. ‘Allow natural death’
roughly translated means ‘Do not interfere by providing ad-
vanced life support measures for patients in an established
death process’. ‘Do not resuscitate’ (DNR) or ‘Do not attempt
resuscitation’ is a clinical decision not to institute advanced life
support measures such as intubation and mechanical ventila-
tion. In practice, ‘Allow natural death’ and DNR are equiva-
lent, although some providers consider ‘Allow natural death’
to be ambiguous but more family oriented.24 In futile cases,
‘withholding life support’ means not starting any artiﬁcial or
radical cardiorespiratory support, and ‘withdrawal of life sup-
port’ means stopping some or all artiﬁcial cardiorespiratory
support measures, which will be followed soon after by death.
It is easier to withhold artiﬁcial life support than to withdraw
it (in other words, starting is a more difﬁcult decision that
continuing), according to the principle that what is excusable
in continuing an action may not be excusable in initiating the
action, yughtafar ﬁ al baqaa ma la yughtafar ﬁ al ibtidai (Majal-
lat Article No. 55), or a parallel principle that continuation is
easier than initiation, al baqaa as hal min al ibtidai (Majallat
Article No. 56). Mortality among DNR patients is high; one
author asked the rhetorical question ‘‘Do patients die because
they have DNR orders, or do they have DNR orders because
they are going to die?’’25 A serious ethical issue arises if patients
on DNR orders die because of neglect by health-care workers,
on the assumption that they are dying anyway.
‘Do not treat’ (DNT) falls under the doctrine of advance
directives (living will), in which the patient or his or her
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ment considered futile for the speciﬁc disease condition. If
the intervention is of minimal or temporary beneﬁt and has
side-effects that make the net beneﬁt zero or even negative, it
is moral not to intervene. DNT refers to interventions for
treating the original condition, such as metastatic cancer. Once
a DNT decision has been made, the patient should be trans-
ferred to a hospice or to palliative care in hospital or at home,
where high-technology interventions are not available and are
not offered. It is emotionally difﬁcult to maintain a DNT order
in a high-technology environment, because of the human ten-
dency to ‘do something’, even if futile. DNT orders can be jus-
tiﬁed under the principle of injury, which calls for desisting
from intervention if the injury, dharar, outweighs the beneﬁt,
maslahat, because prevention of harm takes precedence over
assuring a beneﬁt, dariu al mafasid awala min jalbi al masaalih
(Majallat Article No. 30).
Euthanasia is an act of commission or an act of omission
that hastens death, with the aim of saving the patient from
pain or further suffering, physical or psychological. Active
euthanasia is an act of commission, which involves a positive,
deliberate action to hasten death. Passive euthanasia is an act
of omission, which involves failing to take action to save life.
In Islamic Law, there is no essential moral difference between
commission and omission, because actions are judged by their
intentions, al umuur bi maqasidiha (Majallat Article No. 4),
and they share the same intention, hastening death. Passive
euthanasia is exercised by withholding advanced or basic life
support and is most commonly undertaken in the form of
DNR orders.26 Writing a DNR order for a patient with an
incurable condition who is not in an established death process
is a form of passive euthanasia. Physicians who sign a DNR
order may not consciously be aware that they are undertaking
passive euthanasia. This is the case when a patient with a fatal
condition but who has perfect cardiorespiratory function is put
on DNR. The DNR order will deny them the opportunity for
resuscitation when they enter reversible cardiorespiratory ar-
rest, although it would allow them to survive for a fairly long
time.
Patient mismanagement due to conceptual confusion be-
tween DNR and DNT arises when there is neglect of due pro-
cess required by the principle of certainty to identify and
interpret orders correctly. If DNR is misinterpreted as DNT,
patients are neglected and may not receive routine care because
they are thought to be dying. When DNT is misinterpreted as
DNR, patients may not be resuscitated from arrest due even to
reversible conditions not related to the terminal disease. Writ-
ing a DNR order for a patient with an incurable condition who
is not in an established death process is a form of passive
euthanasia. In such cases, the appropriate response is a DNT
order accompanied by transfer to palliative care or to a
hospice.
Issues related to the principle of prevention of harm, qa’idat al
dharar
The requirement for consent for DNR prevents harm to the pa-
tient according to the principal of dharar (Majallat Article No.
19). The patient or his or her family makes the crucial decision
about DNR.27 DNR and advance directives assure the patient
of prospective autonomy.28 The consent of the patient is themost effective way of fulﬁlling the purpose of protecting life,
because the patient has an inherent interest in life and would
not under normal circumstances seek self-harm. Patients’
choice of DNR or otherwise is affected by their perceived qual-
ity of life,29 their perception that they have a poor prognosis
and their understanding of hospice care. Patients give consent
for DNR, some signing the consent themselves, while the fam-
ily sign for others. A poor physical or psychological condition,
consultant concerns and family wishes were given as reasons
for not involving some patients in discussing DNR.30
Violation of a patient’s autonomy for DNR causes harm to
the patient. Non-medical emotional or social considerations
may lead to a patient’s autonomous choice of DNR being ig-
nored, because cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR) is in-
vested with a heavy emotional impact.31 A school system did
not honor a DNR decision reached by a 16-year-old cardiac
patient with the parents and primary care physician, because
it found it intolerable for teachers and other students to watch
the student go through the agonies of death without doing
anything.32,33 When DNR is discussed or decided late in the
course of an illness, patients’ capacity to participate in the deci-
sion is limited and their autonomy cannot be respected.34,35 A
crucial consideration is the inner intentions of the patient and
the family. If the intention is to reject unnecessary, futile inter-
vention, the autonomous rights are respected. If the intention
is to hasten death in order to avoid further patient suffering,
then DNR becomes a form of passive euthanasia and is not
acceptable. This is in conformity with the principle of intention
that actions are judged by their inner motivation, al umuur bi
maqasidiha.
Consent for CPR protects patients’ interests and falls under
the principle of preventing harm, dharar. There has been much
discussion about the autonomy to consent to DNR, in the ab-
sence of understanding that patients should be given an oppor-
tunity to consent to CPR.36 The autonomous right to consent
to CPR is not discussed because of the presumption that CPR
should be carried out for every case of cardiopulmonary col-
lapse; for example, New York State passed a law making
resuscitation the default position unless refused by the pa-
tient.31 A more positive approach would be to perform CPR
if it is beneﬁcial, unless the patient refuses.37 From a historical
perspective, DNR policies emerged in order to check the ex-
cesses of technology used in response to a universal presump-
tion of consent to CPR.38,39 The existence of the DNR policy
is an inducement for physicians to seek consent for CPR and
not to act on presumptions.40 CPR is carried out in emergen-
cies without consent,41 as there is no time to go through the
normal routines of informed consent.
Paternalism, an attitude whereby physicians consider that
they know what is best for the patient and therefore make deci-
sions without respecting the patient’s autonomy, can harm the
patient’s interests and thus violate the principle of preventing
harm or injury. In many cases, physicians act in the best inter-
ests of the patient, but there may be situations of conﬂict of
interests that cloud their decisions. The physician’s decision is
such situations may be motivated by intentions other than
those that are expressed, violating the principle that the inner
intentions and not the expressed intentions should be consid-
ered, al ‘ibrat li al maqasid wa al ma’ani la li al alfaadh wa al alm-
abaani (Majallat Article No. 3). Paternalism is seen in two ways
in end-of-life decisions: instituting CPR automatically without
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ment of the patient or family. In many cases, physicians do
not discuss DNR decisions with patients and base their decision
on perceived low quality of life, which they may underestimate;
patients might have a different view if they were consulted.42 A
Canadian study indicated that physicians dominate DNR deci-
sions by establishing the strongest predictors of DNR orders as:
physician prediction of survival, physician perception of the pa-
tient’s preferences, physician-diagnosed organ dysfunction,
physician-determined medical diagnosis and the patient’s
age,43 leaving little or no room for patient choice. Over the
years, a movement has been building up against physician
paternalism, because unilateral decisions on withholding and
withdrawing violate patients’ dignity44 and autonomy. The
United States Veterans Health Administration had a policy for-
bidding a physician from entering a DNR order against a pa-
tient’s objections, even if he or she had good reasons to
believe that resuscitation was futile.45
Family assent to DNR protects the patient’s interests in
jurisdictions in which DNR is treated as a clinical decision
by the physician with no input from the patient or a substitute
decision-maker. The requirement that the family be informed
of the decision before it is implemented is in practice a form
of seeking assent, because no physician will sign and imple-
ment a DNR order against loud protests by the family. Family
assent therefore helps to fulﬁll the principle of preventing harm
or injury. Relieving the family of the burden of taking part in
an informed decision for DNR is, in my opinion, a judicious
consideration in accordance with the local culture and family
dynamics. Members of a family do not want to take responsi-
bility for a decision that will end life.
Age discrimination harms patient interests. It is unethical to
base DNR decisions on age alone, on the reasoning that old
people will die anyway. The principle of protecting life oper-
ates equally at all ages, because the predetermined time of
death is never known with certainty: a younger person may
die before an older one. Discrimination against elderly patients
has been documented, with several studies ﬁnding a signiﬁcant
association between old age and DNR orders, age being the
main independent factor for DNR46 after control for disease
severity. Such discrimination was exacerbated at higher ages.47
There is no quantitative reason for withholding CPR on the
basis of age.48 Many elderly people may want to be resusci-
tated but have inadequate knowledge of the process, with the
result that physician preferences for DNR predominate.49
Issues related to the purpose of conservation of resources,
maqsad hifdh al maal
Resource overutilization may derive from admission and treat-
ment in an intensive care unit and may violate the purpose of
protecting and saving resources. The common view that DNR
results in less use of intensive care resources is not true in prac-
tice, however, especially when the orders are written too late in
the course of a disease. DNR patients have been reported to
use more costly resources, as they stayed longer and had higher
hospital charges.50 Savings were made only if DNR orders
were written earlier in the course of the disease51; however,
DNR orders cannot be written very early in the course of dis-
ease because the irreversibility of the death process may not yet
be apparent.Inappropriate use of intensive care resources: Intensive care
units are specialized, multi-disciplinary units with a concentra-
tion of advanced life support skills and technology. They vio-
late the purpose of protecting resources by inappropriate use
in many ways. I would suggest some synonyms for such units
that allude to their potential misuse: ‘futile care unit’ because
of the high mortality and low discharge to normal life, ‘waste-
ful care unit’ because of wastage of high technology resources
in futile interventions, ‘extremist care unit’ because of the use
of high-end technologies, ‘mortuary care unit’ because corpses
are maintained on life support, and ‘hospice care unit’ because
hopeless cases are admitted that should be in palliative care. As
we rethink intensive care operations, we should use discharge
to normal life as a key performance indicator, as it reﬂects
both admission decisions and the care given. Poor outcomes
from an intensive care unit reﬂect the admission of futile cases.
Palliative care fulﬁls the purpose of protecting resources
while providing humane care for the terminally ill. Palliative
care is a resource-saving alternative for terminal patients
who cannot get a net beneﬁt from life support or conventional
treatment. The existence of a large palliative care unit along-
side an intensive care unit will result in considerable saving
of resources, because DNR and DNT patients would be admit-
ted directly to palliation instead of the more expensive inten-
sive care. Palliation involves making the death process as
comfortable as possible. It is performed in low-technology
environments such as the home, a hospice section of a hospital
or an independent hospice. Palliative care involves several
modalities: pain control, spiritual preparation, emotional and
psychological support, communication, appropriate symptom
management with the available essential drugs and medication
without over-treating, nutrition support and occupational
therapy. Alternative or complementary therapy can be used,
such as aromatherapy relaxing treatment, massage, medita-
tion, relaxation and music. Care is taken to prevent the devel-
opment of complications such as infection and pressure sores.
Implementation issues
DNR policies and guidelines fulﬁll the principle of custom,
qa’idat al ‘aadat, by providing consistent guidance to physi-
cians involved in making DNR decisions. Health organiza-
tions differ in their DNR policies, some having formal and
others informal policies and some with no policy. Formal
policies are found more frequently in larger institutions that
are accredited and have ethics committees.52 Implementa-
tion of the DNR concept varies by organization.53 In some,
institutional documentation of discussions and decisions
about DNR is poor.54 Having clear guidelines in all hospi-
tals can go a long way to avoiding mistakes in DNR
decisions.
According to the principle of certainty, physicians must
have adequate knowledge of the DNR process to be certain of
making correct decisions, but this is not often true in practice.
Physician knowledge of DNR issues is variable. The term
‘DNR’ was found to be ambiguous, and the rationale for giv-
ing DNR orders was not well articulated.55 Junior doctors
writing DNR orders had a poor understanding of what
DNR meant,42 and residents had limited knowledge and skills
regarding DNR.56 They were uncomfortable with end-of-life
decisions, misinterpreted the terms ‘DNR’ and ‘futility’ and
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curricula.57
Inconsistency in physician practices relating to DNR re-
ﬂected underlying uncertainties in DNR policies and lack of
or non-adherence to guidelines. It was found that 11% of phy-
sicians who wrote a DNR order for a patient would still do
chest compression when the patient went into cardiac arrest.58
In Taiwan, 77.6% of physicians were willing to inform termi-
nally ill patients and their families about DNR, but 58.4% did
not know whether allowing natural death was legal.59 Ideally,
DNR patients should not be in intensive care units, but it was
found that DNR was initiated by an intensive care physician in
80% of cases and by the most responsible physician in 20%;
ideally, the responsible physician, who knows the patient best,
should write a DNR order. There were delays in obtaining sig-
natures, some orders were not even signed, and discussions
with families were not documented.60 The principle of custom
requires strict adherence to the consensus policies and guide-
lines that are considered part of the Law.
In the stress of emergencies, mistakes can be made in iden-
tifying DNR patients. Hospitals use color-coded wristbands,
but the colors vary, leading to confusion.61 Wrong identiﬁca-
tion has serious consequences; for example, a patient might
not be resuscitated in the mistaken impression that he or she
has a DNR order. Such malpractice is considered a serious vio-
lation of the principle of certainty, which requires that actions
be based on clear, certain evidence.
Deciding who should have a DNR order
In order to deﬁne the procedures involved in DNR, consensus
is needed on the conditions that qualify for DNR. In my visits
to some hospitals, I have seen policies and guidelines with
examples of types of conditions for DNR. There is wide vari-
ation among consultants in DNR decisions in the absence of
more deﬁnitive criteria. Some examples are: advanced multi-
organ failure; irreversible, severe, documented brain damage;
advanced cardiac, hepatic or pulmonary disease; inoperable,
life-threatening congenital heart disease; fatal chromosomal
or neuromuscular disease; irreversible, severe mental and phys-
ical incapacity; advanced incurable, end-stage malignancy;
end-stage renal disease if renal replacement therapy is not fea-
sible; and brain death. This diversity reﬂects vagueness in the
conceptual basis of DNR. The intentions behind a DNR deci-
sion must be clear, because the validity of actions depends on
their underlying intentions, al umuur bi maqasidiha (Majallat
Article No. 2). It is essential to design criteria that reﬂect a
clear intention or objective for DNR orders.
On the basis of the principle of certainty, qa’idat al yaqiin, a
criterion for issuing a DNR order should be based on distin-
guishing an established death process from pre-death. A
DNR order for a condition within the death process is under-
standable because of the futility of reversing cardiorespiratory
collapse. If resuscitation is attempted, the patient will recover
for a short time and succumb again; the only other alternative
is to maintain artiﬁcial life support for an indeﬁnite time with
no hope of recovery. A DNR order for such cases is usually
issued a short time before death, because these conditions
can be ascertained only for patients who are already in the
death process. The term ‘allowing natural death’ is more
appropriate than DNR, because these patients are alreadyon an irreversible trajectory to certain death and there is no
need for futile artiﬁcial interference. Resuscitation of these pa-
tients will have no net beneﬁt that will last for any reasonable
time and would violate the principle of balancing beneﬁt,
maslahat, and injury, mafsadat. An intervention should be
used only if the maslahat far outweighs the mafsadat. Resusci-
tation would also not fulﬁll the purpose of protecting life, maq-
sad hifdh al nafs, because there is no certainty about the life to
be protected.
Many conditions usually recognized as appropriate for
DNR precede but are not part of an established death process.
Patients with these conditions can survive for various periods,
until they succumb to their illness or to some other illness. Be-
cause of the poor prognosis of these conditions, heroic artiﬁ-
cial interference beyond normal maintenance or supportive
treatment of any kind is not appropriate. This includes CPR,
in addition to other surgical and medical procedures. These pa-
tients should not be under the DNR policy but should be cov-
ered by DNT policies. They should also be admitted from the
beginning to wards or palliative care units without advanced
life support facilities, in the knowledge that these will not be
needed. The policy should state that they are not admissible
to an intensive care unit, with appropriate explanations for
their families. Cardiorespiratory collapse in these patients
may or may not be due to their primary condition, but the dis-
tinction is only of theoretical interest, because, in a situation
requiring urgent intervention, there is no time to ascertain
the cause of the collapse. The use of DNR orders for such pa-
tients creates two major moral issues: First, the DNR order is
not based on whether the patient will beneﬁt from the resusci-
tation but on the presumption that even if they beneﬁt from
resuscitation, they will succumb sooner or later to their dis-
ease, so that resuscitation is futile. The futility of resuscitation
in this case is related more to the remote outcome and not the
current cardiorespiratory collapse. This case is therefore one of
taking action without certainty, yaqiin. The second and more
serious issue is that a DNR order is meant to save a patient
from further pain and suffering and constitutes an instance
of passive euthanasia. Thus, a patient with a fatal condition
but who is not in a death process will not be resuscitated if
he or she develops a reversible cardiorespiratory condition
from any cause. Both passive and active euthanasia are illegal
because of the principle that actions are judged by the inten-
tions behind them, al umuur bi maqasidiha. If the intention is
to end life, it makes little difference if this is done actively or
passively.
My simple understanding is that DNR is valid only if the
patient is in the death process, beyond the z point. The princi-
ple of certainty, qa’idat al yaqiin, guides determination of the z
point as a point of irreversible cardiopulmonary collapse. The
purpose of protecting life, hifdh al nafs, is irrelevant beyond the
z point, and the purpose of resource preservation, hifdh al mal,
becomes operational. DNR for any untreatable or incurable
condition before an established death process is a form of pas-
sive euthanasia.
Deciding the content of a DNR order
DNR stands for ‘Do not resuscitate’ and therefore implies
withholding speciﬁc measures that will reverse cardiorespira-
tory collapse. Such measures are considered heroic but futile
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patients with cardio-reversible respiratory collapse, enabling
them to survive longer for a reasonable time. DNR does not
mean ‘Do not care’.62 DNR patients should not be neglected
and should receive all other types of supportive care.
Conclusions
We can conclude from the analyses described above that ethi-
co-legal issues relating to DNR can be analyzed on the basis of
maqasid al shari’at and qawa’id al ﬁqh.
Recommendations
1. The ﬁve basic cardiorespiratory life support measures that
can be included in a DNR order are: cardiopulmonary
resuscitation involving chest compression and oxygenation,
endotracheal intubation, mechanical ventilation, deﬁbrilla-
tion and vasoactive or ionotropic medication. These mea-
sures can be applied in any order and in any combination.
They protect life, hifdh al nafs, provided there is certainty,
yaqiin, of a net beneﬁt lasting for a reasonable time.
2. Life support measures not related to cardiorespiratory sup-
port may or may not be continued during DNR. These
include renal dialysis, blood transfusion, parenteral nutri-
tion, pulmonary hygiene and normal treatment such as
antibiotics.
3. Supportive care should be continued during DNR, includ-
ing clearance of secretions (e.g. oral, nasal, endotracheal),
hydration, nutrition, pain management, supplementary
oxygen, sedation, antipyretics, antiemetics, relief of consti-
pation, relief of urinary retention and relief of dyspnoea
and cough.
4. Education and training will help to disseminate a profes-
sional consensus that will become custom, ‘aadat, on
DNR issues. It is therefore recommended that workshops
be held for all relevant health-care givers on the ethical
issues of end-of-life, with emphasis on understanding the
differences among DNR, DNT and euthanasia and an
appreciation that DNR does not mean stopping conven-
tional and supportive care.
5. Ensure certainty, yaqiin, of implementation and avoid caus-
ing harm, dharar, by specifying in DNR orders the inter-
ventions permitted and those prohibited, such as ‘do not
intubate’.63 The order should also specify which other
life-support functions and nursing procedures should be
continued to avoid neglect of DNR patients on the assump-
tion that they will die soon.
6. Respect the autonomy of physicians who have a conscien-
tious objection to DNR, with discussions on how they can
function in the health-care team in the future. This will pre-
vent harm due to errors by physicians who are forced to par-
ticipate in theDNRprocess when they have nomotivation to
do it well and with enthusiasm. It fulﬁlls the principle of cer-
tainty, qa’idat al qasd, which requires that actions be judged
by and reﬂect inner intentions, al a’amaal bi al al niyaat.
7. Provide more psychosocial support to help families to live
with a DNR decision without feeling guilty. Such feelings
can lead to mental disturbance, thus violating the purpose
of protecting the mind, maqsad hifdh al ‘aql.8. Undertake empirical research on the DNR process in insti-
tutions, covering indications, the decision process and out-
come (death or survival) to identify speciﬁc problems and
ﬁnd solutions.
9. Carry out regular audits, especially of mistakes and mal-
practice, in order to develop institutional learning and insti-
tutional memory, bring about change and development64
and assist evaluations.65
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